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1. INTRODUCTION
Robert Gibbs, the White House Press Secretary, spent the first half-hour of
his May 1, 2009 press corps briefing doggedly deflecting speculation about
Justice David Souter's retirement.' In fact, the questioning had just turned to the
looming HINI virus threat when President Barack Obama unexpectedly stepped
into the James S. Brady Press Briefing Room. 2 "I just got off the telephone with
Justice Souter," 3 he said, "[a]nd so I would like to say a few words about his
decision to retire from the Supreme Court."4  After some gracious remarks
concerning Justice Souter's twenty year tenure as an Associate Justice, the
President turned to the topic of his replacement:
I will seek somebody with a sharp and independent mind and a record of
excellence and integrity. I will seek someone who understands that justice
isn't about some abstract legal theory or footnote in a case book; it is also
about how our laws affect the daily realities of people's lives-whether they
can make a living and care for their families; whether they feel safe in their
homes and welcome in their own nation.
I view that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with
people's hopes and struggles, as an essential ingredient for arriving as [sic]
just decisions and outcomes.5
This was not the first time that President Obama spoke of empathy as one
of his selection criteria; he had mentioned empathy while on the campaign trail.6
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5 id. (emphasis added).
6 See, e.g., Mark Murray, Context of Obama's 'Empathy' Remark, MSNBC: FIRST READ, May 1,
2009, http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2009/05/01/1918695.aspx.
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia-they're all gonna agree on the
outcome. But it's those 5% of the cases that really count. And in those 5% of the
cases what you got to look at it is: What is in the justice's heart? What's their broader
vision of what America should be?
You know, Justice Roberts said he saw himself just as an umpire. But the issues
that come before the court are not sport. They're life and death. And we need
somebody who's got . . . the empathy to recognize what it's like to be a young,
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Yet, the reiteration of the President's empathy standard for judicial nominees re-
ignited a fusillade of criticism against Obama and his judicial philosophy,
broadsides that the President's nominee, then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor, faced
during the hearings. At those hearings, Senator Jeff Sessions charged that
empathy would only debase the legal system:
In my view, such a philosophy is disqualifying. Such an approach to
judging means that the umpire calling the game is not neutral, but instead
feels empowered to favor one team over another. Call it empathy, call it
prejudice or call it sympathy, but whatever it is, it's not law.7
Senator Mitch McConnell blasted Sotomayor's previous statements and writings,
which, to him, suggested that "a judge's personal experiences affect judicial
outcomes" and that "[Sotomayor's] experiences will affect the facts that she
chooses to see as a judge." 8
As senators whetted their knives for the confirmation hearings, across the
street in the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy continued to whittle at fifty years of
settled expectation about notice pleading in the federal courts. In Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, the Court indisputably abandoned the battered presumption that claims in
federal court will go forward unless "no set of facts" show entitlement to relief.9
Instead, complaints are to be evaluated based on their plausibility.' ° And
plausibility, ironically enough, requires a judge to "draw on [his] judicial
experience and common sense.""
teenaged mom; the empathy to understand what it's like to be poor or African-
American or gay or disabled or old. And that's the criteria by which I'm going to be
selecting my judges.
Id. Obama had opposed the confirmation of Chief Justice Roberts due in part to Roberts'
alleged lack of empathy:
In those [5% of hard] cases, adherence to precedent and rules of construction and
interpretation will only get you through the 25th mile of the marathon. That last mile
can only be determined on the basis of one's deepest values, one's core concerns,
one's broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and breadth of
one's empathy.
Remarks of Sen. Barack Obama, Confirmation of Judge John Roberts,
http://obamaspeeches.com/03l -Confirmation-of-Judge-John-Roberts-Obama-Speech.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2010).
7 Kwame Holman, Sotomayor Pledges 'Fidelity to the Law' as Hearings Begin, PBS NEWS HOUR,
July 13, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec09/hearings_07-13.htmi.
8 Paul Kane, 3 Senate Republicans Endorse Sotomayor, WASH. POST, July 18, 2009, at A02.
" 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
'
0Id. at 1949.
1 Id. at 1950. I am not the first to identify this irony. Jessie Hill wrote a short blog entry on the
issue shortly after Iqbal came down. See Posting of Jessie Hill to Prawfs Blog,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/05/some-belated-thoughts-on-twombly-iqbal-and-
sotomayor.html (May 31, 2009, 15:18 EST) ("It seems to me that plausibility as a legal standard-
though it surely makes appearances elsewhere in the law-inherently calls on the judge to make
judgments based on life experiences."). Others have spoken about empathy in adjudication more
generally. See, e.g., Lauren Collins, Number Nine, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 42, 53
(discussing Sotomayor and empathy); Michael Dorf, "Empathy and Justice," Posting of Michael
[Vol. 78:41000
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So, a paradox. On the Hill, conservative senators pillory personal
experience as an element of the judicial function, arguing that judges are duty-
bound to suppress such experience lest it mutate into intolerable "empathy."
Anyone who thinks otherwise, so they say, is not fit to sit as a Justice on the
Supreme Court. Meanwhile, a block away, conservative Justices all but invite
personal experience-couched as "judicial experience" and "common sense"-as
the basis for judicial decision making.
Inconsistent? Perhaps. But the goal of this Essay is not to dwell on the
motes in the eyes of others. Doing so is undeniably self-gratifying. It is also
fruitless, decadent, and common. Nor is the purpose of this Essay to record
another episode of rank partisanship swamping even modest attempts at
principled debate.' 2 Base political posturing explains a lot, but if we assume
politics conquers all, then our entire legal discourse is a vanity. And so, this
Essay will assume that the fundamental question is still worth discussing. Who is
right? The senators or Justice Kennedy? What is the role of empathy in
adjudication?
This Essay argues that empathy does and should play an important, albeit
limited role, in a judge's decision making process. Specifically, empathy is
essential for making correct, principled, and unbiased judgments, because
empathy is one of the few means we have to understand human motivation.
Without empathy, as journalist David Brooks has written, judges "are not
objective decision makers. They are sociopaths . . . ,'" Empathy is a crucial
cognitive mechanism that can help compensate for common cognitive bias. As
such, empathy, appropriately restricted, should be an accepted and meaningful
tool for judges to use in evaluating the sufficiency of complaints, especially as
they relate to Iqbal's plausibility pleading standard. While the focus of this
Essay will be on empathy as it relates to pleading, the insights of this Essay point
to broader applications within the entire structure of the Rules of Civil Procedure
("Rules").
Part II of this Essay discusses the Iqbal decision and its antecedents, and
identifies the cognitive problems with the plausibility standard in pleading. Part
III describes recent research on empathy, and explores how a narrow
understanding of empathy can make plausibility pleading meaningful and more
accurate. Part IV discusses the implications of the relationship between empathy
and adjudication in the larger context of the Rules and civil jurisprudence.
II. PLEADING: PLAUSIBILITY, PROBABILITY AND POSSIBILITY
For half a century, lawyers learned by rote the Conley v. Gibson standard
for dismissal of a complaint: "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure
Dorf on Doff on Law Blog, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/05/empathy-and-justice.html (May 22,
2009, 11:19 EST). However, I do believe I am among the first to connect this case with the
growing body of literature on the psychology of empathy and behavioral law and economics.
12 For example, consider the realignment of the parties with respect to the propriety of judicial
filibusters in the Senate after the election of Obama. See Editorial, Giving Hypocrisy a Bad Name,
WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2009, at A30.
13 David Brooks, The Empathy Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, May 29, 2009, at A25.
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to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 'R Then, an
earthquake. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, a seven member majority seemed
to abandon the Conley standard.
5
Twombly arose from litigation surrounding congressional attempts to
stimulate competition in the telecommunications industry. In the 1980s, the
Justice Department forced the breakup of American Telephone & Telegraph into
various smaller local telephone companies. 16  These incumbent telephone
companies, the "Baby Bells," took over regional telephone service.' 7 The Baby
Bells possessed distinct advantages in this deregulated market: they owned the
physical plant, cabling, switching, and other infrastructure necessary to provide
service.1 8 Plaintiffs William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus sued, alleging that
the Baby Bells had engaged in parallel conduct, by, among other things
declining to compete against other incumbent carriers in contiguous markets.
I6
According to the plaintiffs:
[I]n light of the parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent
competition . . . Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that [the
defendants] have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to
prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or high
speed internet services markets and have agreed not to compete with one
another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to one another.2°
The lower court litigation turned on whether simple allegations of parallel
conduct could state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) when the actual conduct was
equally explainable as the product either of illegal collusion or coincidence. 2'
The circuit court erred on the side of letting the case go forward-at least to
discovery.22 Reciting shop-worn Conley, only where "no set offacts ... would
permit a plaintiff to demonstrate" illegal collusion, could the court dismiss the
complaint.23
14 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
15 See 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007); see also id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (remarking that if
Conley "is to be interred, let it not be without a eulogy").
16 Id. at 549.
17Id. at 548.
18 See Covad Commc'ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 532-34 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Twombly,
550 U.S. at 550 (citing Covad for history of deregulation).
'9 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
20 Id. at 551 (quoting Complaint T 51, App. 27) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Id. at 553. Specifically, the lower court had said "to rule that allegations of parallel
anticompetitive conduct fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have to
conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular
parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than coincidence." Id. (quoting Twombly
v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22 Id.
23 Id. (quoting Twombly, 425 F.3d at 114) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 78:41002
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The Supreme Court reversed.24 Justice Souter, writing for a seven member
majority, observed that few courts had ever taken Conley's "no set of facts"
formulation literally.25 Instead, courts had demanded various amounts of facts in
the pleading to survive a motion to dismiss.26 According to the majority,
Conley's "no set of facts" formulation "is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard. ',27  "[A]fter puzzling the
profession for 50 years," Justice Souter observed, "this famous observation has
earned its retirement., 28 Instead, pleadings must contain "enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.L29
Criticism of Twombly's "plausibility" pleading standard followed.3 ° Lower
courts lamented the lack of clarity of Twombly.31 Some scholars saw Twombly as
abandoning the Rules' commitment to notice pleading.32 But uncertainty about
Twombly's scope tempered this criticism. Specifically, Twombly did not clarify
whether it set out a new pleading standard for all cases, or only for a subset of33
particularly complex ones. Ashcroft v. Iqbal dispelled any uncertainty. In Iqbal
24 id
251 Id. at 562.
26 id.
271 Id. at 563.28 id.
29 Id. at 570 (emphasis added). Among the reasons cited by the majority for the switch to
plausibility pleading was the enormous costs of discovery in antitrust suits, costs that the majority
believed were not adequately controlled by either judicious pre-trial management of discovery,
summary judgment procedures or jury instructions. Id. at 558-59.
30 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431, 431, 433 (2008) (declaring
"[n]otice pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility pleading" and concluding that Twombly is "an
unwarranted interpretation of Rule 8 that will frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims to
get into court"); Suja Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 Mn'N. L.
REv. 1851, 1855, 1867-68 (2008) (exploring how the Court's interpretation of the motion to
dismiss standard dispenses with the requirements to preserve the jury in cases at common law
under the Seventh Amendment). But see Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 877 (2009) ("[T]he Supreme Court's decision in
Twombly does not alter pleading rules in as drastic a way as many of its critics, and even some of
its few defenders, suppose."); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REv.
1063, 1064 (2009) (suggesting that angst regarding Twombly is "largely unwarranted"). For an
argument that the reaction to Twombly and Iqbal is overstated, and that there is a way to harmonize
the rulings with the text of the existing Rules, see Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62
STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming May 2010), Working Paper available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=1442786.
31 See, e.g., Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (referring to Twombly
formulation as "less than pellucid"); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008) (acknowledging decision is "confusing").
32 See Spencer, supra note 30, at 457-59.
33 See, e.g., CBT Flint Partners v. Goodmail Sys., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(noting reluctance to think that the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the rules of pleading
outside of the normal rule making process and limiting Twombly to complex cases); Edward D.
Cavanagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
877, 890 (2008) (noting that some of the reasoning of Twombly seemed limited to complex cases).
2010] 1003
HeinOnline  -- 78 UMKC L. Rev. 1003 2009-2010
UMKC LAW REVIEW
the Court held that plausibility 3pleading is trans-substantive-it applies to all
civil cases in the federal system.
Iqbal involved the immediate post-September 11 detention of Javaid Iqbal,
a Muslim Pakistani. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
Justice Department conducted a sweep of approximately one thousand potential
suspects.35 One hundred and eighty-four of these suspects, including Iqbal, were
designated persons of "high interest," held incommunicado in a maximum
security facility and locked-down for twenty-three hours a day.36
Iqbal subsequently brought a Bivens action against John Ashcroft, the
former Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI. 37  Iqbal
alleged that they specifically selected him as a person of "high interest" on the
basis of race, religion and national origin in violation of his First and Fifth
Amendment rights. He further alleged that both Ashcroft and Mueller willfully
and maliciously knew of, condoned and agreed to subject Iqbal to this
discriminatory treatment.39
The Court dismissed Iqbal's suit against Ashcroft and Mueller.4 ° The Court
emphasized that the plausibility standard of Twombly was not confined to
antitrust cases, but governs the pleading standard "in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts."'' In any civil case in federal
court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. '42 Instead, the plaintiff must support
legal conclusions with "well-pleaded factual allegations.' ' 3 These allegations
must be taken as true, but, even then, scrutinized to see whether "they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief." 4 Whether such facts give rise to a plausible
claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.
34 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). Justice Souter, who wrote the majority opinion
in Twombly, and Justice Breyer, who joined the majority in Twombly, both dissented in Iqbal.
Their objection was not to the "plausibility" standard, but that its application to Iqbal's case
required dismissal of the complaint, properly construed. Id. at 1956-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 1943.
36 Id. Iqbal eventually pled guilty to crimes related to fraudulent immigration documentation and
was deported. Id.
37 Id. A Bivens suit is a judicially crafted cause of action against federal agents for violation of
constitutional rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392-95
(1971). Although judicially crafted, many of its doctrinal defenses track those of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.35lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943-44.
39 Id. at 1944.
40 But not other prison guards and officials named in the complaint. See id. at 1952 ("[W]e express
no opinion concerning the sufficiency of respondent's complaint against the defendants who are not
before us.").
41 Id. at 1953 (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 Id. at 1949.
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Furthermore, because Iqbal alleged invidious discrimination, he had to
"plead sufficient factual matter to show that [Ashcroft and Mueller] adopted and
implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason
but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national
origin.' 46 The Court concluded that it was far more plausible that Ashcroft and
Mueller's motivation was a benign or neutral motivation to hold immigration
violators in secure conditions until they could be identified or cleared as potential
terrorists. 47 The Court recognized that the detention "would produce a disparate,
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, '4 8 but that alone did not make
discriminatory motive more plausible than a neutral alternative.
Iqbal raises a host of issues about access to justice, the war on terrorism,
institutional competence, and race.49 But one perhaps overlooked facet of Iqbal
is that it lays bare both the fact that pleading doctrine is a form of "choice
architecture ' '50 and that the materials used to build that architecture are seriously,
and ineluctably, deficient.
As Cass Sunstein has written, "the legal system is pervasively in the
business of constructing procedures, descriptions, and contexts for choice."51
Juries are selected, evidence is either presented or suppressed, and decisions are
made as to which cases should go forward and which should be dismissed.
These choices are framed, presented in a certain sequence, and limited by certain
cannons and by certain people, all of which impact outcomes. Iqbal is one of the
unusual cases that expose the meager and borrowed nature of the materials with
which we build this architecture. Words are all we have to go on.52 But words in
civil procedure strive to shape decision making with a precision that they can
never completely deliver.
One source of this imprecision is the nature of legal language itself. Law is
an extremely conservative language system. It is hostile to neologism, and often
finds itself constrained by its own ossified terminology.5 3 It is unsurprising that
Iqbal and Twombly both strenuously deny that they impose a "probability"
46 Id. at 1948-49.47 Id. at 1952.
41Id. at 1951.
49 A symposium on Iqbal held in March 2010 at the Penn State University, Dickinson School of
Law touched on some of these issues.
50 RIcHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPiNESS 11, 81-83 (2008) (coining term "choice architecture"). Indeed, not only
Civil Procedure, but also the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Criminal Procedure are part of this
choice architecture.
51 Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & EcoNoMIcs 2 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000).52 See TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ & GUILDENsTERN ARE DEAD, act I, p. 32 (1967).
53 Cf Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009)
(No. 07-665) (Kennedy, J.) (discussing the public forum doctrine as applied to this case as
presenting an "an example of the... tyranny of labels").
2010] 1005
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requirement at the pleading stage. 54 Probability-at least in the civil context-is
typically understood as the province of the jury.55 Probability pleading would
have been a true sea change in the division between judge and jury.
Even apart from preserving the appearance of notice pleading, couching the
pleading standard as plausibility rather than probability may have some limited
utility. It may inhibit judges from expressly assuming the functions of a jury-
functions guaranteed to the parties by the Seventh Amendment. 56 But without
some richer understanding of the mechanism by which judges make their
decisions, or the diction that best shapes those decisions, it hardly rationalizes the
gate keeping function of judges beyond the speculative. The Iqbal Court avoided
the linguistic shoals of "probability" pleading, but did little to navigate out of the
danger of erroneous judicial decisions.57
A related deficiency is that the terms used in civil procedure often appear
selected without reference to data on what linguistic framing best accomplishes
the goals set for a system of procedure.58 The Iqbal Court engineered a new rule
of pleading, but without the help and investigation vital to determine whether in
fact its new standard accomplishes its avowed purpose. What does plausibility
pleading mean? What is a mental demarcation between the probable, the
plausible and the possible? Judges routinely make decisions based on these
terms-whether a claim is plausible,59 whether a rational jury could come to
more than one conclusion 6°-and yet, there seems precious little investigation as
to which word choices actually lead to the type of cognitive shaping demanded of
the judicial system.
In the specific instance of pleading, the Iqbal decision seems largely
uninformed by psychological evidence detailing the way in which human beings
-including judges-assess likelihoods. Psychologists and other cognitive
scientists know that human beings do not assess likelihoods by mathematics.6'
Only homo economicus actually does the math. Homo economicus has unlimited
54 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007)).
55 See Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of
Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 650 (2006) ("In a civil action...
the jury, if there is one, will find for the party which they consider to have the higher probability of
being correct in its assertions. The probability which it is the function of the jury to assess is
clearly not a statistical probability; for each trial is unique and cannot be considered as one out of a
large number of similar trials.") (quoting M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 6 (1979)).
56 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law.., the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved ....").
57 In this context, an erroneous choice would be one in which a meritorious claim is dismissed as
"implausible" or a frivolous claim is allowed to proceed as "plausible."
58 This is where the work of empiricists is helpful. Cf infra note 77.
59 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
60 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-27 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 594 (1986).
61 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 6-8.
1006 [Vol. 78:4
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62
mental resources. 2 Homo economicus assesses the probability of events with
cold, rational precision.63 And homo economicus is a work of fiction, like Hari
Seldon 64 or Hercules. 65 Human beings don't do the math; they use back-of-the-
envelope estimates, short cuts, and rules of thumb-methods that cognitive
scientists and other behavioral scholars have termed heuristics.
66
Heuristics are the mechanisms by which humans cope with limited
cognitive capacity.67 Frequently, heuristics lead to correct predictions. People
assume that the sun will rise in the morning because the sun has risen every
morning in the past.68 More importantly, heuristics are unavoidable. Individuals
have neither the time nor the raw computational ability to make many complex
decisions,69 and so we assess likelihoods of certain outcomes by best-guesses
based on experience.
But heuristics can also lead to seemingly irrational decisions-or
systematically biased ones. For example, people routinely make biased decisions
due to the availability heuristic-the tendency to "estimate the frequency of a
class by the ease with which they can recall specific instances in that class., 70 A
person may think a type of cancer is particularly common because one has a
friend recently diagnosed with that disease.71 People also routinely misjudge
probabilities by relying on the representative heuristic, which involves
"comparing the similarity of the case with the image or stereotype of the class. 72
So, for example, people will overestimate the likelihood that a woman reading a
book, wearing glasses and shawl, with her hair in a bun, is a librarian or teacher
62 See id. at 6 ("[H]omo economicus can think like Albert Einstein, store as much memory as
IBM's Big Blue, and exercise the willpower of Mahatma Gandhi.").
63 Id.
6 Hari Seldon is the genius from Isaac Asimov's Foundation series, who can predict the future
based on mathematical probability. See ISAAC AsIMOv, FOUNDATION 26 (1991) (1951).
65 Hercules, the mythological figure, is Ronald Dworkin's exemplar of the supremely wise and
supremely principled judge. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239 (1986).
6 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 777, 780 (2001).
67 This limitation is known as "bounded rationality." See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS, supra note 51, at 14 (citing Herbert Simon).
61 Id. at 15 (noting that heuristics are "useful on average"). The rising sun example comes from the
philosopher David Hume.
69 See id. at 14 ("Bounded rationality... refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities
are not infinite .... We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories.").
70 RICHARD H. THALER, The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Economics, in QUASI-
RATIONAL ECONOMICs 152 (1991).
71 Conversely, a person may think that a type of cancer is not common because a person cannot call
to mind anyone with that disease. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Controlling Availability
Cascades, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 51, at 381.
72 THALER, supra note 70, at 153.
2010] 1007
HeinOnline  -- 78 UMKC L. Rev. 1007 2009-2010
UAMC LA W REVIEW
when it is statistically more likely that she has some other type of occupation. 3
These are but two illustrations of the heuristics and biases that arise simply from
the phenomenon of human cognition.74
Judges, although often better trained than laypersons, are not immune from
faulty heuristics. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski and Andrew Wistrich have all
conducted experiments on the decision making of judges.75  These scholars
concluded that "[e]mpirical evidence suggests that even highly qualified judges
inevitably rely on cognitive decision-making processes that can produce
systematic errors in judgment., 76 Further, judges, being humans after all, possess
implicit biases, "stereotypical associations so subtle that people who hold them
might not even be aware of them., 77 These biases are sometimes, perhaps often,
directed against African-Americans or other minorities, and may appear even if
the judge also exhibits deep personal and institutional commitment to impartiality
and equality. 78 Researchers speculate that this implicit bias may result from
repeated exposure to minorities in the justice system. 9
The upshot of this research is that heuristics and their associated biases are
often born of experience, and in the same way they are limited by experience. 80
In a world of plausibility pleading, these heuristics have consequences.
Depending on how the inquiry is framed, whether a judge can accurately assess
whether an event is plausible may have much to do with whether, and how, the
judge has experienced the event alleged. As Jessie Hill wrote of Justice Kennedy
in Iqbal: "[Y]ou can almost read between the lines to hear him saying, 'I have
never been a victim of discrimination, and I certainly cannot imagine folks like
John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, folks just like me, engaging in illegal
discrimination against Muslims in the wake of 9/11 ....
III. EMPATHY AND EXPERIENTIAL DEFICIT
This is where empathy-in the limited sense of the cognitive capacity or
training to imagine oneself in the position of another person-becomes
73 My thanks to Stephanie D. Preston for this familiar example. See also Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Introduction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 4 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (for another version of this example).
74 For more of these heuristics, see generally Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW &
EcONOMICS, supra note 51, at 1-10. See also Guthrie et al., supra note 66, at 780, who observe that
"the very nature of human thought can induce judges to make consistent and predictable mistakes
in particular situations."
75 See Guthrie et al., supra note 66.76 Id. at 779.
77 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009).7 1Id. at 1221-26.
79 Id. at 1227.
80 See Cass R. Sunstein, Economics and Real People, 3 GREEN BAG 397, 400 (2000) ("Because
everyone's experience is limited, the availability heuristic will produce systematic errors.").
s Hill, supra note 11.
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important. Empathy is essential to overcoming the limitations of experience. By
making conscious effort to imagine themselves in the position of another, judges
can arrive at better estimations of whether a set of facts, taken as true, present a
plausible claim.
Humans are hard-wired for empathy-that much can be said with
confidence.82 But the circuitry for empathy, as for almost any other human
phenomenon, is extremely complex. Researchers are just now pulling apart the
tangle. Depending on the scholar, empathy can consist of one or more of a
number of phenomena: 83 (1) emotional contagion: the automatic sharing of
mental or emotional states, but perhaps without awareness of the trigger for the
sharing, 84 (2) perspective taking: the conscious ability to infer the mental or
emotional state of another person, without necessarily sharing the other's
emotional state or desiring to help that other person,85 (3) sympathy: which is the
ability to appreciate and to be moved by another person's emotional state, but not
necessarily share his or her physical or emotional state,86 and (4) altruism or
helping behavior: the act of providing aid, assistance or succor to another.
Although the research is still tender, economic scholars have suggested that
empathy-in the specific sense of "perspective taking"--is an essential tool to
accurately predict the behavior or motivations of others when choosing in
circumstances of uncertainty-as, for example, in the famous prisoner's
82 See, e.g., Tania Singer, Ben Seymour, John P. O'Doherty, Klass E. Stephan, Raymond J. Dolan
& Chris D. Frith, Empathetic Neural Responses Are Modulated by the Perceived Fairness of
Others, 439 NATURE 466, 466 (2006) (explaining that recent brain imaging studies "suggest that
our ability to empathize relies on neuronal systems that underpin our own bodily and emotional
states"); cf Dominique J.F. de Quervain, Urs Fischbacher, Valerie Treyer, Melanie Schellhammer,
Ulrich Schnyder, Alfred Buck & Ernst Fehr, The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, 305
SCIENCE 1254, 1254, 1258 (2004) (exploring the reward-related brain centers that are activated
when a person punishes a norm violator, even if the punishment imposes costs on the punishing
party).
83 Admittedly, some of the problems with studying empathy are definitional. "There are probably
nearly as many definitions of empathy as people working on the topic." Frederique de Vignemont
& Tania Singer, The Empathetic Brain: How, When and Why?, Opinion, 10 TRENDs IN COGNITIVE
Sci. 435, 435 (2006).
84 Id. ("[T]he baby starts crying because other babies cry but the baby is not necessarily aware that
the other is the source of their affective state.").
85 Id. (With cognitive perspective taking, one "represents the mental states of others, including
affective states, without being emotionally involved."); see also Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B.
M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 1, 4 tbl. 2
(2002) (referring to this phenomenon as "cognitive empathy" or "true empathy" or "perspective-
taking").86 See Lauren Wisp6, The Distinction Between Sympathy and Empathy: To Call Forth a Concept, a
Word Is Needed, 50 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCOL. 314, 318 (1986). To Wisp6 "empathy is a way of
'knowing.' Sympathy is a way of 'relating."' Wisp6's definition is useful in that she defines
sympathy as a cognitive process that leads to prejudice, whereas empathy is a cognitive process
concerned with accurate estimation of another's subjective state. See id. at 318-20; see also
Preston & de Waal, supra note 85, at 4 tbl. 2; Vignemont & Singer, supra note 83.
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dilemma.87 The common features of empathy and perspective taking "allow
humans to represent states of other people: others' intentions, beliefs and
thoughts... ."8' Hence, scholars reviewing behavioral data estimate that "people
with stronger empathetic abilities are better predictors of others' motives and
actions."89 Preliminary experimental evidence confirms this hypothesis. In a set
of experiments involving University of Chicago MBA students and University of
Michigan undergraduates, management researchers discovered that individuals
consistently fail to correctly identify the risk preferences of others.90 Those
persons with greater self-reported empathy predicted others' risk preferences
more accurately.9'
Three additional aspects of this empathy research are pertinent to pleading.
First, empathy is easy if you share either some attribute or experience with
another person. A judge does not have to labor very hard to imagine life as a
woman, if the judge is a woman.92 Second, humans can employ higher order
cognitive functions to inhibit, modify or stimulate this empathetic process.93
Specifically, individuals can choose to actively imagine themselves in the
position of another as compensation for a lack of previous experience.
94
Individuals can also actively decide to inhibit the desire to help another-
especially another that looks or lives the same way they do-by cognitive
discipline. Third, the accuracy of an individual's assessment of another person's
emotional state or motivations naturally increases with additional information. A
person with limited information is more likely to "project" his or her emotional
state or motivations onto another. With more information the assessment of
another person's emotional state or motivations become more accurate. 95
87 Tania Singer & Ernst Fehr, The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy, 95 AM. ECON.
REv. 340, 340 (2005) ("Economics and game theory are based on the assumption that people are
capable of predicting others' actions.").
" Id. at 343.89 id.
90 David Faro & Yuval Rottenstreich, Affect, Empathy, and Regressive Mispredictions of Others'
Preferences Under Risk, 52 MGMT. Sc. 529, 538 (2006).
91 Id. To gauge empathy, the subjects of the study rated themselves on a five-point response
measure to questions such as "I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person" or
"[s]ometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems." Id. at 537-
38.
92 See Vignemont & Singer, supra note 83, at 439 ("[I]t should be noted that prediction accuracy
depends on the similarity between the empathizer's and the target's experiential repertoires."); see
also Frans B. M. de Waal, Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The Evolution of Empathy, 59
ANN. REV. PsYCH. 279, 286, 287, 291 (2008); Preston & de Waal, supra note 85, at 16.
93 See Preston & de Waal, supra note 85, at 5, 6, 20; Vignemont & Singer, supra note 83, at 437.
94 See Preston & de Waal, supra note 85, at 16-17 (noting that although similarity or familiarity
accelerates the ability for an individual to understand another's emotional state in a given situation,
"given longer to decide, a subject can apply conscious cognitive process to interpret the state of an
unfamiliar object").
95 Id. at 17 ("The degree to which it is empathy rather than projection depends purely on the extent
to which the subject's representations are similar to those of the object, or include information
about the object, which in turn determine accuracy.").
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The difficulty is in adequately policing the line between better decision
making based on improved cognitive processes, and partisan decision making
based on altruistic impulses.9  In other words, if what we strive for is
impartiality, our rule system doesn't need to repudiate empathy as much as
harness it. Ideally, controls will be fashioned from word choices that encourage
perspective taking to compensate for experiential deficits, while simultaneously
arresting the empathetic process at the moment it turns into altruism, prejudice or
bias.
IV. BUILDING A BETTER DECISION MAKER
If the Rules are a type of choice architecture, then they can be designed
with the object of minimizing the type of cognitive errors that judges and juries
are prone to make. In the case of pleading doctrine, rule makers could take into
account that judges will likely make more accurate decisions based on more-
rather than less-information, that they are more likely to understand the motives
of a party if they share some common experience or characteristic with that party,
that they can compensate for lack of personal experience with an active
empathetic process, and that they can develop a coordinate ability to suspend the
empathetic process when it begins to trigger bias.
In the limited sense of the demand for additional information, Iqbal may be
a reasonable idea, badly articulated. Even those lawyers brought up on the
Conley "no set of facts" standard knew that the more factual information
presented to the judge, the less likely the case would be dismissed at the pleading
stage. Indeed, a major complaint with Conley was and continues to be that the
"no set of facts" formulation in practice did not prevent judges from imposing
their own experience on the analysis. Assuming-and this is a huge and
controversial assumption-that what the Rules should do is make the gate
keeping role at pleading more accurate-rather than more deferential-Iqbal
may actually be a good thing.
97
Where Iqbal goes wrong is not in its demand for more facts-at least when
those facts are available. 98 Where Iqbal goes wrong is in its articulation of a
standard that seems to privilege experience, without demanding impartiality.
Iqbal seems to invite judges to determine plausibility based upon their own
experience, rather than forcing them to do the hard work to imagine themselves
in the scenario presented within the four corners of the complaint. "Judicial
experience" in operation looks too much like "my experience." And "my
96 The costs of additional procedural protections versus the expected benefits are also at issue, but
not directly addressed in this Essay.
97 As I remark below, while pleading may be made more informative, and gate keeping more
accurate by more information at the pleading stage, it is at the cost of our previous policy choice
that it is better that a frivolous or erroneous suit to go forward to discovery than it is to dismiss a
marginal, but ultimately meritorious case.
98 I leave aside the major defect of both Twombly and Iqbal--the fact that it imposes a plausibility
requirement at the stage in which evidence of motivation and intent may not even be available to
the plaintiff.
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experience" may or may not include the experience of the litigants. The second
way Iqbal (as well as Twombly) goes wrong is that it works a major reformation
of pleading doctrine without the benefits of the rule making process. This has
been a common complaint among civil procedure scholars. 99 Where I would add
to this chorus is that, in the specific context of empathy, it is the rule making
process that is best positioned to research, consider, and craft the empathy
regulating devices essential for more accurate decision making.
If empathy is in fact essential for more accurate decision making, then it
suggests a far more ambitious project than this Essay can develop. But it does
hint at some important directions for further research and policy. For example,
judicial training could begin to incorporate some of the experiments that Jeff
Rachlinski and others have conducted, in which judges are assessed for bias.'
The point of these exercises is not to embarrass these public servants, but to
enable them to understand their own baseline cognitive biases so that through
their higher cognitive processes they may compensate for these biases, without
overcompensating.l01
On a macro level, civil procedural scholars, rule makers, and other stake-
holders should become more attentive to behavioral studies on the shaping power
of their choice design. Insofar as these groups shape decision making, they are
the engineers of a type of choice architecture. This choice architecture can have
a number of goals. To the extent the Rules are trans-substantive, an important
overarching goal of the Rules will be to provide the mechanisms to reduce the
likelihood that decision makers-whether the judge or the jury-will fall into
common cognitive errors.
10 2
The goal of less cognitive errors cannot stand alone, however. Precise
decision making is meaningless without a shared understanding of the target. A
Swiss clock can be set to chime precisely at noon, in precisely the wrong time
zone. Democratic commitments and societal norms will, of necessity, supply the
goals to which this better decision making is directed. For example, the history
of American pleading has been based on an implicit assumption that it is better
for ten meretricious suits to go forward (at least to discovery) than it is for one
meritorious suit to be dismissed. 103 This value may still operate even with a more
99 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Celebrating Jack H. Friedenthal: The Views of
Two Co-Authors, 78 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 9, 28 (2009) ("[A]mendment by judicial fiat is a
piecemeal process of revision that threatens to undermine the overall coherence of the Federal
Rules and to create inconsistencies of application.").
1oo See Rachlinski et al., supra note 77, at 1204-08.
101 See id.
102 This is the seed for one of my larger projects, which is to suggest the reasons and the methods
by which the Rules of Civil Procedure can be understood and developed as a system to reduce the
incidence of common cognitive errors among jurors. See also Guthrie et al., supra note 66, at 826-
30.
103 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1, 25 (2009)
(observing that the Court has signaled with Twombly that it prefers judicial efficiency over the
previous standard in Conley which favored fairness and access, even at the cost of some meritless
suits going forward).
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refined plausibility pleading standard. In other circumstances, choice
architecture may deliberately invite, rather than arrest, empathetic processes, as a
counterweight to implicit societal bias. For example, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 contains a disparate impact cause of action to account for
discrimination that is not intentional, but is the result of hidden biases in the
employment process itself.14 To the extent that Title VII, or any disparate
impact theory of recovery, actually requires individuals to imagine how their
policy choices will affect persons they otherwise would disregard, then the
legislation itself is designed to err on the side of empathy.
V. CONCLUSION
The Honorable Jerome Frank wrote that "[T]he judicial judge. . . should be
vitally imaginative ... quick with empathy, the capacity to feel himself into the
minds and moods of other men[.]"' 5 His observation rings true half-a-century
later. Ours is a nation of laws. But law is a human institution, touched in equal
measure by human aspiration and human frailty. To pretend that empathy has no
place in our judicial system is to pretend that we are judged by Patriarchs or
computers. 10 6 Empathy is part of being human. The question is, what do we do
with the reality of empathy? The answer is, we do with empathy what we do
with most human traits: we capture it, we tame it, we channel it, and we make it
serve our ultimate, shared goal of a more perfect justice.
'04 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). One may also cite victim impact statements in the criminal area
as an empathy encouraging procedure.
05 Jerome Frank, Corbin on Contracts, 61 YALE L.J. 1108, 1112 (1952) (book review); see also id.
at 1113 ("[A] judge who knows nothing but the rules will be a judicial routineer, a dispenser of
injustice, since... the art ofjudging really lies in the ability to cope with the unruly.").
'06 Darrell A. H. Miller, State DOM4s, Neutral Principles, and the Mdbius of State Action, 81
TEMP. L. REv. 967, 987 n.131 (2008) ("[J]ustice is administered by human beings, not biblical
sages or computers."); Ruth Marcus, Behind Justice's Blindfold, WASH. POST., May 6, 2009, at A21
("[I]f the right answer was always available to the judge who merely thinks hard enough, we could
program powerful computers to fulfill the judicial function.").
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